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Abstract
This Article discusses the issue of excessive
patent protection and possible remedies; the discussed remedies are the usage of antitrust laws or
simply replacing certain patents with copyright protection. This Article first explores the relationship
between patent protection and antitrust law. It then
describes a number of tests that have been used in
the past and one proposed new test, designed to confront this interrelationship. While considering these
tests, this Article applies two controversial realworld patents to each in order to examine their benefits and problems. This Article then goes on to discuss the possible benefits of protecting inventors
through copyright laws. Generally, the primary goal
of regulating these areas of law is to reach an optimal level of “consumer welfare” consisting of innovative products at competitive prices. While this Article discusses numerous legal theories, they will be
framed in the context of attempting to produce the
greatest amount of consumer welfare.
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INTRODUCTION
As of September 2012, Americans were using
234 million mobile devices, 119.3 million of which
were smartphones.1 This incredibly large demand
for communication devices has encouraged highstakes litigation between market competitors over
many issues. On May 14, 2012, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit heard a case
brought by Apple Inc. (“Apple”) against Samsung
Electronics Co. Ltd. (“Samsung”).2 One of the issues
before the court was whether it should issue a preliminary injunction preventing the sale of a number
of Samsung products that allegedly violated Apple’s
patents for a large rectangular smartphone display
1 Stephanie Adamo, comScore Reports September 2012 U.S.
Mobile Subscriber Market Share, COMSCORE (Nov. 2, 2012),
http://www.comscore.com/Insights/Press_Releases/2012/11/com
Score_Reports_September_2012_U.S._Mobile_Subscriber_Mark
et_Share. As of September 2012, Samsung held 26 percent of
the United States smartphone and non-smartphone original
equipment manufacturer (OEM) market share. Apple
possessed only 17.5 percent of the OEM market share. In terms
of smartphone operating systems, Google led with 52.5 percent,
then Apple followed with 34.3 percent. Other competitors such
as RIM, Microsoft, and Symbian held 8.4 percent, 3.6 percent,
and 0.6 percent, respectively. Id.
2 Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co., Ltd., 678 F.3d 1314 (Fed.
Cir. 2012).
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(the D’677 patent)3 and a software feature known as
the “bounce-back.”4 The issues were remanded back
to a California District Court, where the jury granted
Apple $1,049,393,540 in damages for Samsung’s patent infringement5 and an injunction banning sales
of Samsung’s Galaxy 10.1 tablet computer.6 Samsung appealed the court’s decision, resulting in the
court sustaining the injunction,7 then removing the
injunction8 on the Galaxy Tab 10.1. Immediately following that development, Samsung filed suit against
Apple for its then newly released iPhone 5.9 The
companies, as of April 2014, have at trial over a new
Id. at 1317.
Id. at 1318.
5 Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co., Ltd., No. 11-CV-01846LHK 2012 WL 4078433 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2012); see Apple
Demands More Than $2 Billion from Samsung for Patent
Infringement, INFOWORLD (Apr. 1, 2014),
http://www.infoworld.com/d/the-industry-standard/appledemands-more-2-billion-samsung-patent-infringement-239587
(lowering the final judgment to an amount of $929 million).
6 Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co., Ltd., No. 11-CV-01846LHK, 2012 WL 2401680, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2012).
7 Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co., Ltd., No. 11-CV-01846LHK, 2012 WL 4097751, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2012).
8 Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co., Ltd. No. 11-CV-01846LHK, 2012 WL 4490558, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2012).
9 Joanna Stern, Apple v. Samsung Battle Goes On: Galaxy
Tab Ban Lifted As Samsung Pushes for iPhone 5 Ban, ABC
NEWS (Oct. 2, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/applesamsung-wages-galaxy-tab-ban-liftedsamsung/story?id=17376176; see also Florian Mueller,
Samsung Asserts Eight More Patents Against Apple in
California, Including Two FRAND Patents, FOSS PATENTS
(Apr. 18, 2012, 11:33 PM),
http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/04/samsung-asserts-eightmore-patents.html (explaining that Apple and Samsung have
filed patent litigation against each other in nine countries
other than the United States).
3
4

330

PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.2 (2014)

The Patent Reform Debate

body of utility patents. 10 In the present case, Apple
has requested that the jury grant damages in excess
of $2 billion.11
Other technological firms are injecting themselves into high-stakes patent litigation as well.
Google is claiming $4 billion in damages against Microsoft for failure to pay licensing fees on patents related to Microsoft’s Xbox gaming system. 12 VirnetX
was awarded $368.2 million against Apple for unlicensed use of their technologies in Apple’s Facetime
program.13 Additionally, Apple filed suit against
Samsung, claiming that the version 4.1 of the Android operating system infringed some of Apple’s
software patents.14 All of these claims were brought
just within the first two weeks of November 2012.
According to Judge Richard Posner, “patent
protection is on the whole excessive and . . . major
reforms are necessary.”15 He made this comment
while referring to the $1,049,393,540 verdict, in
2012, against Samsung, which awarded Apple one of
the largest verdicts in the history of patent litiga10 Martyn Williams, Apple Demands More Than $2 Billion
from Samsung for Patent Infringement, INFOWORLD (Apr. 1,
2014), http://www.infoworld.com/d/the-industry-standard/appledemands-more-2-billion-samsung-patent-infringement-239587.
11 Id.
12 Google v. Microsoft Patent License Trial Begins, BBC NEWS
(Nov. 13, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology20314883.
13 Apple Loses Facetime Patent Lawsuit to VirnetX, BBC NEWS
(Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-20236114.
14 Id.
15 Richard Posner, Do Patent and Copyright Law Restrict
Competition and Creativity Excessively?, BECKER-POSNER BLOG
(Sept. 30, 2012, 10:30 PM), http://www.becker-posnerblog.com/2012/09/do-patent-and-copyright-law-restrictcompetition-and-creativity-excessively-posner.html.
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tion.16 Competitors in the technology industry are
finding that, in order to effectively compete, they
must not only excel in the market itself, but in the
courts as well. This excessive amount of litigation
has turned the judicial system into a secondary, but
essential, arena for companies to challenge each other.
I. PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW
Patent law protects inventors by granting
them the right to exclude others from benefiting financially from their innovations.17 Article I, Section
8 of the Constitution gives Congress the power to
grant patents. 18 The purpose of that section is to
promote innovation by securing inventors, for limited
amounts of time, “the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”19 Patents are primarily governed by Title 35 of the United States Code. 20
Patents offer patentees the “right to exclude others
from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the
invention throughout the United States.”21 However,
these protections expire after twenty years.22
In some instances, patents are granted to protect inventors from competition that arises after the
inventor has made major investments into research
16 Id.; Jessica Vascellaro, Apple Wins Big in Patent Case,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 25, 2012, 1:41 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100008723963904443584045776
09810658082898.html.
17 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 35 U.S.C. § 2; see also Leahy-Smith America Invents Act,
Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (changing patent
system from first-to-invent to first-to-file).
21 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012).
22 Id.
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and development.23 In other situations, marketplace
competitors become so powerful that other competitors are driven out.24 Competition is conducive to innovation, and sometimes patent overprotection stifles innovation by eliminating competition. 25
Patent owners will not be denied relief or
found guilty of patent misuse if they derive revenues
from their patents, sell licenses to others, enforce patent rights against infringement, refuse to license
certain rights, or “tie” patents to other patents in another market, unless the patent owner has market
power in the market of the other patent that the first
patent is being tied to. 26 Patents should be understood as negative rights. They provide the patentee
the right to exclude; the ability to exclude in patent
law is somewhat different than the concept of exclusion involved in antitrust law.27
As indicated in the introduction to this Article,
there are many types of patent lawsuits being
brought. It is important to distinguish between design patents and, the most common type, utility patents.28 Utility patents grant protection to “any new
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof.”29 Utility patents are particularly useful because they allow inventors to exclude others from
23 Christopher Leslie, Antitrust and Patent Law as Component
Innovation Policy, 34 J. CORP. L. 1260, 1261 (2009).
24 Id. at 1265.
25 Id.
26 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012).
27 Robin Feldman, Patent and Antitrust Differing Shades of
Meaning, 13 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 8 (2008).
28 DON W. MARTENS & JOHN B. SGANGA, JR., PRE-LITIGATION
PATENT ENFORCEMENT § 2:7 (2012) (noting that patent number
8,000,000 was granted in 2011).
29 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
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making, using, or selling their inventions.30 Some
inventions that are particularly likely to acquire utility patents are mechanical devices, electronic devices, chemical compounds, and production processes.31
Design patents, on the other hand, grant protection for the nonfunctional ornamental aspects of
an invention.32 So, design patents protect the product’s appearance, not its functionality. 33 In order to
determine whether a design patent has been infringed, a fact finder must determine “whether an
ordinary observer would find that the allegedly infringing design has a ‘sameness of appearance’ to the
patented one, not whether the accused infringer used
the same artistic idea in general.”34 This Article analyzes both design and utility patents.
American antitrust laws were created with the
purpose of protecting and promoting competition. 35
Although one of the goals is to prohibit collusion, this
Article will focus primarily on the goals aimed
against exclusion.36 Exclusion, in the context of antitrust law, refers to monopolists keeping their competitors from entering into markets and competing
through some anticompetitive conduct. The legislative intent to counteract exclusion particularly applies where
35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012).
MARTENS & SGANGA, supra note 28, at § 2:7.
32 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2012).
33 MARTENS & SGANGA, supra note 28, at § 2:7.
34 Daniel H. Brean, Enough Is Enough: Time to Eliminate
Design Patents and Rely on More Appropriate Copyright and
Trademark Protection for Product Designs, 16 TEX. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 325, 332 (2008) (citing Gorham Mfg. Co. v. White, 81
U.S. 511, 528 (1871)).
35 JOHN MILES, 1 HEALTH CARE AND ANTITRUST LAW § 1:2
(2013).
36 Id.
30
31
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a firm takes an action that precludes others
from competing against it and is particularly
troublesome where the firm engaging in this
type of conduct already has substantial market power or where the market in which it
competes is highly concentrated, when its exclusionary action lacks any procompetitive
justification, or when the exclusion results
from collusion among several firms. 37

Antitrust laws are meant to protect competition; desired consequences consist of lower prices, higher
output, and increased innovation. Anticompetitive
conduct tends to deny these benefits to consumers.38
II. BALANCING PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAWS
Both patent and antitrust laws share the goal
of benefiting the consumer through increased innovation, but there is an inherent paradox within their
particular methods of operation. Patents focus on
promoting innovation; innovation is protected by allowing inventors to exclude others from using the
claims of their patents. Antitrust laws focus on promoting competition, but sometimes increased competition is achieved by condemning the exclusion creat37 Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (partially governing
antitrust law, section 2 of the Sherman Act provides that
“[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize . . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on
conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding
$100,000,000 . . .”); 1 LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK,
CALLMAN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND
MONOPOLIES § 4:29 (4th ed. 2012) (noting that a company’s
large size is not indicative of a monopoly, but if it were to be
abused, courts should take size into consideration).
38 Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust
Paradox, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 761, 768 (2002).
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ed by patents.39 In Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of
America, Inc., the court stated that “[w]hen a patent
owner uses his patent rights not only as a shield to
protect his invention, but as a sword to eviscerate
competition unfairly, that owner may be found to
have abused the grant and may become liable for antitrust violations . . . .”40 The Supreme Court explained in Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat that, in
order for complainants to establish a private antitrust action, they must be able to prove that they suffered an “injury of the type the antitrust laws were
intended to prevent” and that the injury either “reflect[s] the anticompetitive effect either of the [antitrust] violation” or other unlawfully anticompetitive
conduct made possible by or related to that violation.41 The ideal marketplace would consist of equilibrium between innovation and competition, but neither patent nor antitrust laws alone encourage
movement towards equilibrium.
A number of tests have been used and proposed in order for courts to maximize consumer welfare by balancing the virtues of both patents and antitrust laws. The most common approach for courts
to determine whether a company has exceeded patent or antitrust boundaries is to inquire into the
“scope” of the patent.42 Generally, if the patentee’s
actions fall within the scope of the patent, they would
Id. at 762-63.
Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572,
1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
41 Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977);
1 ALTMAN & POLLACK, supra note 37, at § 4:48; see 15 U.S.C. §
15 (2012) (granting standing to “any person who shall be
injured in his business of property by reason of anything
forbidden in antitrust laws”).
42 Carrier, supra note 38, at 788-89.
39
40
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be considered immune from antitrust litigation. 43
Actions falling outside of the patent’s scope are only
subject to antitrust liability if there is a showing of
anticompetitive behavior.44
Another test focuses on the patentee’s intent. 45
In a case decided by the Ninth Circuit,46 the court
determined that there is a presumption of legality
when a patentee has patented products, but this presumption can be rebutted if the patentee’s actions
can be shown to have had a pretextual business justification to mask anticompetitive conduct. 47 This “intent test” requires the court to examine the defendant’s subjective intent.48
These tests have been the basis for courts’ patent analyses in the past, but Michael Carrier, in
Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, proposes
an alternative.49 He suggests, in his Common Denominator Test, that there be an initial presumption
that a monopolist’s conduct is lawful so long as there
is an objective justification for patent-based actions
other than harming competitors.50 The test then
provides a chance for rebuttal, from the alleged patent infringer, to demonstrate that competition, not
patents, is responsible for innovation in the industry.51 At this point, the court should consider the
type of industry involved and determine whether it is
Id. at 788-89.
Id.
45 Id. at 793-94.
46 Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125
F.3d 1195, 1219 (9th Cir. 1997).
47 Carrier, supra note 38, at 788-89 (citing Kodak, 125 F.3d at
1219.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 765.
51 Id. at 765.
43
44
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one where innovation is derived from massive investments into research and development, or if it is
an industry where competitors continuously improve
upon products with relatively little investment into
research and development. 52 The patentee may then
counter with a surrebuttal demonstrating that the
market in question is characterized by innovation; if
he can successfully do so, he will not be liable for the
antitrust action.53
III. COPYRIGHT LAW
Copyrights protect original works of authorship that are “fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now or later developed, from which they
can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated.”54 Protection for copyrighted materials lasts
for the creator’s life plus 70 years. 55 Among many
other things, copyrights protect pictorial, graphic,
and sculptural works.56 The term “original” only requires that the work be created independently by the
author and that “it possesses at least some minimal
level of creativity.”57 Only a slight amount of creativity is required; most works easily satisfy this minimal level because they possess some creativity, “no
52 Id. at 818; see id. at 831, 756 (noting that for the rebuttal to
be effective, the alleged patent infringer must demonstrate that
industry innovation is primarily dependent on a competitive
market by showing that there are market-based incentives to
innovate, the product is not difficult to create, the product is
difficult to imitate, or that the industry is characterized by
innovation built upon previously developed products).
53 Id.
54 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
55 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2012).
56 17 U.S.C. § 102.
57 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 345
(1991).
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matter how crude, humble or obvious [they] might
be.”58 Designs must be original and nonfunctional,
but, similar to design patents, the protection extends
only to those particular features.59 Copyright protection for artistic craftsmanship will be afforded to features that can be identified separately from and that
are capable of existing independently of the article’s
utilitarian aspects.60
Copyrights, unlike design patents, protect only
the expression of ideas, as opposed to ideas themselves; concepts similar to the already common ideas
cannot be protected, or otherwise, “the first to come
up with an idea will corner the market.”61 In order
to prove a copyright breach, plaintiffs must show
proof that the “defendant copied the plaintiff’s copyrighted material.”62 The plaintiff must also prove
that the copying was “so extensive that it rendered
the infringing and copyrighted works ‘substantially
similar.’”63
A typical defense against copyright claims is
the fair use doctrine. It allows for parties, other than
the copyrighting party, to make “transformative” uses of the copyrighted material. 64 The statute requires courts to analyze the defense by using four different factors: (1) the purpose and character of the
use (i.e., whether it is used for commercial purposes),
Id.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
60 Id.
61 Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1443
(9th Cir. 1994).
62 Johnson v. Gordon, 409 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing
Segrets, Inc. v. Gillman Knitwear Co., 207 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir.
2000)).
63 Id.
64 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
58
59
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(2) the nature of the copyrighted work, (3) the substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work, and (4) the effect of the use upon the
potential market.65 By serving a different purpose,
adding a new meaning, or adding a new expression
to a work, transformative works promote artistic
progress.66 As a new creation becomes increasingly
more transformative, the other factors that would
weigh against a fair use defense, such as commercialism and effects on the market, become less significant.67
IV. COMPETING TESTS
Although there are numerous ongoing patent
cases that may have even larger impacts on the
technology industry than the aforementioned litigation between Apple and Samsung, this Article only
considers Apple’s D’677 (design patent) and ’381
(utility patent) patents to analyze how the scope, intent and Common Denominator tests apply in terms
of initiating antitrust liability. After exploring the
option of counteracting patent protection with antitrust laws, this Article will explore the alternative of
using copyright laws. The copyright laws will only
be applied to the D’677 patent because copyright law
is only practical for replacing design patents.
The D’677 patent was issued on June 29, 2010
claiming a simple smartphone design with a large
rectangular display.68 It also specifies that the
phone’s corners are rounded, the phone’s face is a
Id.
Brean, supra note 34, at 350-51.
67 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 570
(1994).
68 Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co., Ltd., 678 F.3d 1314, 1317
(Fed. Cir. 2012).
65
66
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highly-polished, reflective surface, and that the design contains no ornamentation other than a rectangular speaker slot above the display and a circular
button below.69

Figure 1. D’677 Patent Design70
This minimalistic design drew sharp criticism
from Samsung in the wake of the $1,049,393,540
verdict; a Samsung statement argued that it was
“unfortunate that patent law can be manipulated to
give one company a monopoly over rectangles with
rounded corners.”71
U.S. Patent No. 7,469,381 (the ’381 patent), or
the bounce-back feature, was designed for Apple’s
smartphones and tablets, the iPhone and iPad. 72
This feature, protected by the ’381 patent, is engaged
while the user is scrolling through a document on the
device.73 When the user scrolls beyond the end of the
document, sees an area indicating the document’s
Id.
Id.
71 Samsung to Appeal After $1bn Apple Award in US Case,
BBC NEWS (Aug. 25, 2012),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-19381096.
72 Apple, 678 F.3d at 1318.
73 Id.
69
70

341

PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.2 (2014)

The Patent Reform Debate

end and releases his or her finger, the document
“bounces-back” into view.74
Seeking to find a favorable system for analyzing the D’677 and ’381 patent protections, this Part
will apply the scope, intent and proposed Common
Denominator tests to evaluate whether antitrust liability should be invoked to counteract anticompetitive behavior connected with patents.
A. The Scope Test
Courts commonly consider the scope of a patent’s grant when deciding if a patentee misused a
patent. Patent owners cannot improperly extend
their power into the marketplace by surpassing the
scope of what Congress intended to grant through
patent law.75 Filing for a patent requires that the
patentee give a detailed description of the invention
describing the manner of its production that is clear
enough for somebody “skilled in the art” to recreate
the invention.76 The courts use this rule of specificity
to determine the scope of the patent; as long as the
action falls reasonably within the patent grant, a patent misuse defense will never succeed. 77 Because of
this, the scope test is highly favorable to patent protection and the legal monopolies granted to inventors. If a claim were to arise concerning a patentee’s
actions that fall within the scope of the patent, the
Id.
Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572,
1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
76 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012).
77 Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1328
(Fed. Cir. 2010) cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 2480 (U.S. 2011); see
Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1341 (Fed. Cir.
2004); Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860,
869 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
74
75

342

PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.2 (2014)

The Patent Reform Debate

actions would presumably be considered lawful. 78 If
the patentee’s actions are found to be outside of the
scope of the patent, a defendant may allege “patent
misuse” as a defense and possibly recover under section 2 of the Sherman Act.79
The first step in the scope test is to determine
whether the patent falls within the specific description as given by the patentee. Assume that the alleged infringer produced a smartphone that utilized
the design of the D’677 patent and the bounce-back
feature of the ’381 patent. Under the scope test, the
patentee would simply claim that the competitor took
the product design of a rectangular display with
rounded corners and bounce-back feature, and applied it to his own product. The defendant may either deny that he has copied the patented design or,
in some instances, argue a defense of patent misuse.80
Patent misuse, an affirmative defense to an allegation of patent infringement, allows a party to also invoke antitrust laws against a patentee if the defendant can prove that the patentee filed the patent
application with a scheme to create an illegal monopoly or to restrain trade.81 In United States v. Am.
Tobacco Co., the United States Supreme Court explained that restraints of trade embrace acts, contracts, agreements, or combinations of these which
“prejudice [the] public interest by unduly restricting
Carrier, supra note 38, at 790.
1 ALTMAN & POLLACK, supra note 37, § 4:57 (explaining
that if a patentee is able to lessen or destroy competition
through the “exclusionary power of the illegal patent claim,” the
elements for a monopoly are present and the defendant may
counter with an antitrust suit).
80 Id.
81 Id.
78
79
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competition or unduly obstructing the due course of
trade.”82 The party that allegedly infringed on the
patent essentially takes the place of the government
by asserting a claim to annul a patent for fraud. 83
Furthermore, if the fraudulently procured patent violates section 2 of the Sherman Act, the party that allegedly infringed the patent may seek treble damages for the harm imposed by the patent. 84
B. The Intent Test
The intent test is used in some jurisdictions; it
looks at the subjective intent of the patentee. 85 Juries are to presume that the patentee’s desire to profit from its patent rights is “legitimately procompetitive.”86 There is opportunity for rebuttal if there is
evidence that “the [patentee] acquired the protection
of the intellectual property laws in an unlawful
manner” or that there was a misleading pretext to
the patentee’s act. 87 Patentees may not “rely upon a
pretextual business justification to mask anticompetitive conduct.”88
If the patentee, the owner of the D’677 and
’381 patents, were to file suit against a competitor,
applying the intent test, the fact-finder would have
to determine the patentee’s subjective intent for enforcing the patent. Here, the presumption stands
U.S. v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179 (1911).
Id.
84 Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp.,
382 U.S. 172, 173 (1965)
85 Carrier, supra note 38, at 793-94; see Image Technical
Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1219 (9th
Cir. 1997).
86 Kodak, 125 F.3d at 1219.
87 Id.
88 Id.
82
83
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that the patentee’s actions are legitimately procompetitive. But, if the alleged patent infringer can
demonstrate that the patent was either illegally obtained or that the patentee used a business pretext
to mask his anticompetitive conduct, the patentee
could then face antitrust liability. Examples of such
anticompetitive conduct include tying arrangements,
grant-back provisions, purchaser resale restrictions,
restrictions on licensee’s sales elsewhere, mandatory
package licensing, royalty provisions that are not
reasonably related to the licensee’s sales, and resale
price restrictions.89
Along with the intent test taking a substantial
amount of power from patentees, it may also cause a
drastic shift toward antitrust law.90 Focusing on the
patentee’s intent may be especially problematic because every company is essentially in business to
outsell its competitors.91 In order to prove the patentee’s subjective intent, discovery could likely lead
to documents or e-mails that appear provocative, but
there is the possibility that they just have been made
during the course of healthy competition. 92 In the
course of competition, it is natural that firms desire
to outsell their market rivals; patent protection, in
some instances, may be the only practical means of a
firm prevailing. The benefit of exclusion, which is
offered by patents, can wither away if patentees have
to strike a delicate balance between excluding under
the patent laws and not interfering with competition,
which is protected by antitrust laws.93
MILES, supra note 35, at § 5:12, at *15 (2012).
Carrier, supra note 38, at 794.
91 Id. at 794.
92 Id.
93 Id.
89
90
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C. Introduction to the Common
Denominator Test
If the courts were to apply the proposed Common Denominator test, they would begin with the
presumption that “a company’s patent-based actions
are lawful as long as there is a plausible justification
for the action other than injuring competitors.” 94
One such example of a plausible justification would
be “efficiency.”95 Instead of looking at the patentee’s
subjective intent, the court should consider the objective circumstances surrounding the patentee’s justification.96 Patents essentially allow for a legal monopoly over certain products, so “[s]uch a strong presumption makes sense not only because a company’s
actions based on its valid patents are not the typical
‘bad acts’ punished under section 2, but also, relatedly, because they are the intended reward of the patent system.”97
V. THE COMMON DENOMINATOR TEST AND THE
APPLE V. SAMSUNG LITIGATION
A. Rebuttal, Ex Ante Factors, Ex Post Factors
and Surrebuttal
Once the patentee demonstrates a plausible
justification for its patent-based actions, the alleged
patent infringer may then set out to prove the rebut-

Id. at 816-17.
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472
U.S. 585, 609-10 (1985) (ruling that a ski ticket distributor’s
exclusion of a ski resort’s tickets was not based on a plausible
justification, rather, the justification led to an inefficient and
inconsistent logical outcome).
96 Carrier, supra note 38, at 816-17.
97 Id. at 817.
94
95
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tal.98 The rebuttal determines whether industry innovation is rooted in patents or competition. 99 If the
innovation arises from an industry that is considered
to be competition-based, such as a technological field,
then the rebuttal surmounts the presumption of lawfulness.100 The presumption of lawfulness can be
surmounted even when patent-based acts do not appear to be predatory, because, as Carrier claims, “patents cannot be the ultimate trump card.”101 To determine the type of industry, the courts have to consider both ex ante and the ex post factors.
The first ex ante factor that must be proven by
the alleged patent infringer is that the market in
question has “market-based nonpatent incentives to
innovate in the industry.”102 Examples of such incentives would include the ability for the innovator to
be a market pioneer103 or the competition taking
place in a “network effects market.”104 In terms of
market pioneers, industries, including pharmaceuticals, cigarettes, oil-drilling rigs, investment banking,
or even computer and semiconductor industries, allow for the early innovators to sustain substantial
market shares even after their patents expire. 105
Possible explanations for this occurrence are customer familiarity, brand loyalty, and cost advantages. 106
The term “network effects market” refers to markets
Id. at 818.
Id.
100 Id. at 819.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 831.
103 Id. at 821.
104 Id. at 822.
105 Id. at 821-22.
106 Id. at 821-22 (noting that in consumer goods businesses,
pioneers have amassed twenty-nine percent of the market while
late entrants gained only twelve percent).
98
99
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that benefit each participant through the cumulative
effect of adding other participants.107 The social
networking website Facebook is an example of a
network effects market that envelopes a larger market share and higher value as it becomes more popular.
After proving that there are non-patent incentives to innovate in a market, the alleged patent infringer must prove at least one of the two remaining
ex ante factors: “that the product is easy to create or
that it is difficult to imitate.” 108 Patents are particularly important in instances where investments of
time and capital are very high; on the other hand,
they are less important when there is a relatively
smaller time and capital investment.109 The pharmaceutical industry is an example of an industry
where products are exceedingly more difficult to create and requires spending “hundreds of millions of
dollars and take[s] ten to fourteen years to bring new
drugs to market.”110
Industries where patents do not spur innovation, including aircraft production, semiconductor
production, vehicle designing, and primary metals,
may actually enhance industry-wide innovation by
moving away from patents and more toward antitrust liability. 111 In terms of the degree of difficulty
to imitate products, patents are more necessary
when it is relatively easier for competitors to imitate
the product.112
Referring back to the pharmaceutical indusId. at 822.
Id. at 831.
109 Id. at 823-24.
110 Id. at 824.
111 Id. at 826-27.
112 Id. at 827.
107
108
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try, it may take years and millions of dollars to develop a new drug, but once it is marketed, the cost of
imitation may be low because competitors could copy
the product.113 Such a low cost to reverse-engineer
and copy could be devastating to drug developers and
other innovators of the sort, who have carried the research and development costs. Some industries, such
as those that require complex mechanical engineering or intricate machinery, may not necessitate patents due to the difficulty to imitate. 114 Carrier’s
test, attempting to optimize innovation, provides an
industry-specific analysis that carefully considers the
need for patent protection. The Common Denominator test has a number of factors that, if at least one of
them is met, “ensures that the presence of marketbased incentives alone does not trigger the conclusion that patents are not necessary in the industry.”115 These safeguards are present because market-based incentives could be existent in industries,
such as pharmaceuticals, that are dependent on patent protection.116
Carrier explains his belief that patent protection is not essential when a product is either easy to
create or difficult to imitate on its innovations. 117
His theory, that patent protection may not be essential, is based upon the industry-specific analysis,
and, more particularly, whether companies need to
recoup up-front research and development costs.118
So, by Carrier’s approach, patents are not needed
when a product is easy to create or difficult to imitate
Id. at 827.
Id. at 828.
115 Id. at 831.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
113
114
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because substantial expenditures were not put into
its creation or it is naturally difficult to imitate. 119 In
such situations, he argues that competition, not patent protection, is essential for innovation. 120
The next stage of analysis focuses on the ex
post factor. Here the courts should analyze the “cumulative nature of innovation in the industry.”121
The term “cumulative industry” refers to an industry
producing products that are continuously improved
and innovated upon.122 Products in cumulative industries usually consist of those that have a newly
innovated feature combined with already existing inventions. Thus, a danger arises in this type of industry where a patent is issued and subsequent innovations are stifled.123
Another inverse relationship exists here between patent and antitrust law: this particular type
of industry may benefit from antitrust law which
would possibly lead to an increase in innovation due
to the cumulative effect of competitors “one-upping”
each other.124 Carrier argues that antitrust laws
should play a greater role in industries that innovate
off of predecessors’ inventions.125 The Common Denominator test’s rebuttal applies only when “both ex
ante and ex post factors favor competition.”126
After analyzing the rebuttal, the court may
find that innovation will best be supported through a
competitive market that is enhanced by antitrust
Id.
Id.
121 Id. at 839.
122 Id. at 829.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 832.
126 Id.
119
120
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law; but, just because a patentee is involved in a certain industry does not suggest that he should be automatically liable for an infraction of section 2 of the
Sherman Act.127 After a successfully proven rebuttal, the Common Denominator Test allows for a surrebuttal.128 The surrebuttal simply requires that the
patentee provide actual evidence that the industry is
distinguishable as one that is innovative, thus confining this test only to industries that are discernibly
non-innovative.129
After the Common Denominator Test’s presumption, rebuttal, and surrebuttal have been applied, and there is any question as to whether they
are applicable to the perceived antitrust activity, the
default assumption is that the action is lawful. 130
Carrier explains that the Common Denominator Test
should not apply to section 2 of the Sherman Act to
industries that innovate through both patents and
competition; the pharmaceutical industry fits this
description.131
B. Applying the Common Denominator Test to
the D’677 Patent
First, in the case of the D’677 patent, the
courts would begin with their initial presumption:
the patentee’s actions are lawful as long as he can
provide an objectively plausible justification for his

Id. at 833.
Id.
129 Id. at 834 n.314 (noting that “some true (i.e., nonsham)
innovation is enough” and that the lack of innovation should be
apparent if a market is not benefiting from new and improved
products).
130 Id. at 832.
131 Id.
127
128
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actions.132 Suppose that the patentee brings a patent
infringement suit against a competitor because the
competitor is producing and selling a smartphone
with a rectangular-shaped screen and rounded corners, thus enforcing the D’677 design patent. Countering the claim, the alleged infringer may pinpoint
one of the patentee’s actions and argue that it constitutes anticompetitive behavior. If the court accepts
the patentee’s justification as plausible, then the
competitor may offer a rebuttal. 133
The alleged infringer’s rebuttal will take into
account the type of industry that is involved by going
through the Common Denominator test’s ex ante and
ex post factors.134 First, the alleged infringer will
need to establish that there are market-based nonpatent incentives for the patentee to innovate. 135 In
this scenario, the patentee was the market pioneer
who designed the rectangular smartphone with
rounded corners, so he had the early accessibility to
the market in order to establish customer familiarity,
brand loyalty, or cost advantages such as favorable
contracts with distributors. These would certainly
constitute market-based non-patent incentives to innovate.136 The rebuttal also requires that the competitor prove at least one of the two remaining ex
ante factors.137
The two remaining ex ante factors are whether
the product is easy to create and whether it is difficult to imitate. Considering the D’677 patent’s description, the court would have to inquire into the
See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 50, 96-98 and accompanying text.
134 See supra note 51 and Part V.A.
135 See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
136 See supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text.
137 See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
132
133
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level of difficulty in inventing a smartphone with a
highly-polished rectangular screen and rounded corners. Certainly a sophisticated technology company
will hire expert designers and engineers to devise an
optimal product, but the D’677 patent reveals no
greater skill than “that exercised by the ordinary designer who is chargeable with knowledge of the prior
art.”138 The costs of developing the D’677 patent are
presumably microscopic compared to the costs of researching and developing in a field such as pharmaceuticals. In terms of the difficulty to imitate the
D’677 patent, as shown by the competitor’s actions,
there would be very little difficulty in copying the
general smartphone design. Therefore, because the
patent would be easy to copy, the only two successfully rebutted ex ante factors would be that there are
market-based non-patent incentives to innovate and
that the patented product was relatively easy to create. Fulfilling two of the three ex ante factors satisfies the ex ante requirement, but the ex post requirement still remains.139
Courts must consider, for the ex post requirement, whether the industry innovation comes about
in a cumulative manner.140 The smartphone, and
technology industry in general, is very innovative.
New products are constantly being released. But, in
terms of cumulative technology, design features like
the D’677 patent are not the result of cumulative
technology. The D’677 patent protects a unique design feature which was developed independently by
Apple designers. Perhaps the D’677 patent is similar
138 Gen. Time Instruments Corp. v. U.S. Time Corp., 165 F.2d
853, 854 (2d Cir. 1948).
139 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
140 See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
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to the design of the original iPhone that was released
in 2007, but in August 2012, a jury even confirmed
that the D’677 design was not copied from a previously released Samsung tablet, as Samsung had argued.141 The design patents of the smartphone industry, including the D’677 patent, are not created
through cumulative innovation. Because the D’677
patent is not brought about through cumulative innovation, the ex post factor is not met.
According to Carrier’s framework, failure to
meet the ex post factor is sufficient enough to end the
analysis in favor of the patentee.142 In other words,
in the case of the D’677 patent, the analysis would
not even go as far as the surrebuttal stage. Furthermore, the ex ante requirements do not appear to
be well-suited in the case of design patents. Relative
to other patented inventions, design patents are
nearly always easy to create and easy to copy. It appears that, in the case of the D’677 patent, the Common Denominator test fails to institute any substantive antitrust claim for the allegedly infringing parties.
C. Applying the Common Denominator Test to
the ’381 Patent
Suppose that the patentee brings a patent infringement suit against a competitor because the
competitor is producing and selling a smartphone
that has a bounce-back feature similar to that described in the ’381 patent. Applying the Common
Denominator test to the ’381 patent begins with the
same presumption that the patentee’s actions are
141 Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co., Ltd., No. 11-CV-01846LHK 2012 WL 4078433 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2012).
142 Carrier, supra note 38, at 832.
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lawful as long as he can provide an objectively plausible justification for his actions.143 The patentee
would be bringing his lawsuit to enforce the protections granted by the ’381 utility patent. Countering
the claim, the alleged infringer may pinpoint one of
the patentee’s acts and argue that it constitutes anticompetitive behavior. If the court accepts the patentee’s justification as plausible, then the alleged
infringer may offer a rebuttal.144
In determining the ex ante factors, there are
the same market-based non-patent incentives for the
’381 patent to innovate as existed with the D’677 patent (e.g., customer familiarity, brand loyalty and
cost advantages).145 The next two factors to determine are whether the ’381 patent was easy to create
and difficult to imitate.146 In terms of the degree of
difficulty in creating the ’381 patent, it is certainly
more difficult to develop than the D’677 patent, but
not too difficult to create by Carrier’s standards.147
By Carrier’s standards, difficulty in creation is
essentially measured by time and capital investments into research and development; the ’381 patent would fall into Carrier’s “simple ideas easily
conceived” category.148 He contrasts inventions in
the technological realm, such as the ’381 patent, with
the pharmaceutical industry, which requires much
See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 50, 96-98 and accompanying text.
145 See supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text.
146 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
147 See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
148 Carrier, supra note 38, at 826 (arguing that patents are
not necessary in industries such as internet business methods,
civilian aircraft, semiconductors, office equipment, motor
vehicles, rubber products, textiles, primary metals,
instruments, food, steel, and electrical components).
143
144
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more time and capital investment for research and
development.149 The ’381 patent would not be difficult to create by the Common Denominator test’s
standards. In terms of difficulty to imitate, it is not
clear what a court would determine in this category.
Creating the bounce-back feature was relatively easy
for the patentee, so it would presumably be not too
difficult for a competitor to imitate.150 Even though
the ’381 patent would be relatively easy to imitate, it
would still be more difficult than imitating the D’677
patent or any other design patent. Therefore, the
’381 patent would be, by Carrier’s standard, easy to
create and moderately difficult to imitate.
The ’381 patent protects a smartphone feature,
the bounce-back, which exhibits the industry’s newest utility innovations. The historical chain of innovation leading to smartphones started with “landline” telephones, then rudimentary mobile telephones were invented and the modern cellular telephone was based upon that technology. Less complex cellular phones were continuously innovated
upon until all of the available technology was finally
compiled into the first modern smartphone. Innovations for the more rudimentary cellular phones led to
smartphone technology. With smartphone technology came the innovation of features such as document
readers; the bounce-back utility was subsequently
innovated to compliment these new features.151
The courts would likely recognize that the
Id.
Difficulty in creating the bounce-back feature is being
compared to the difficulty of creation in other fields such as
pharmaceuticals and complex engineering.
151 The Evolution of the Mobile Phone, ENG’R’S F. MAG. (Nov.
6, 2013), http://www.ef.org.vt.edu/2013/11/the-evolution-of-themobile-phone.html.
149
150
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technology, communications, and smartphone industries, in their present states, are the result of continuous cumulative innovation. These products are
quickly outdated by newer models and designs that
have innovated from previous designs. The cumulative nature of the smartphone industry satisfies the
Common Denominator’s rebuttal, thus allowing for a
surrebuttal from the patentee.152
A surrebuttal may be successfully made if the
patentee demonstrates that his industry is inherently innovative.153 In this case, the ’381 patentee
would have to provide actual evidence of innovation.
Utility features in the smartphone market are constantly being updated by new products that are exceedingly more innovative.
Undoubtedly, the
smartphone market is inherently innovative, at least
in terms of smartphone functionality, due to the extensive research and development of new products by
technology firms.154 Because of the inherently innovative nature of the smartphone industry, the patentee’s surrebuttal is satisfied and the ’381 patent
will likely not lead to any antitrust liability.
D. Applying the Common Denominator
Test in General
Carrier’s Common Denominator test would
provide the industry-specific analysis that patents
should receive, but have not in the past. He argues
See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
154 Dividend Kings, 4 Tech Giants Ready To Surge On
Smartphones, SEEKING ALPHA (Nov. 6, 2012, 10:28 AM),
http://seekingalpha.com/article/982361-4-tech-giants-ready-tosurge-on-smartphones (discussing the major role played by
industry leaders such as Microsoft, Apple, Google and the new
market entry of Amazon).
152
153
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that this test would not have any more than a minor
impact on patent-based incentives in markets where
they should be present.155 The Common Denominator test allows patents to remain valid even after a
patentee has faced antitrust litigation because the
test is just designed to provide an antitrust remedy
when patents are used in anticompetitive ways. 156
Carrier also argues that this test is only applicable to
monopolists, i.e., companies with at least a sixty to
seventy percent market share; other patentees, with
smaller market shares, lack the ability to exercise
control over markets.157
This test may be making an unfounded logical
leap towards antitrust liability when there is a more
simple solution. With the Common Denominator test
there are two extremes: one where all patentee
actions are lawful and the other, where patentee
actions are subject to antitrust liability. This quick
jump to enforce a patent or antitrust law ignores the
middle ground where patents are still valid in
industries in which patents stifle innovation.
Carrier’s test already determines whether
patent protection is essential in an industry; this is
why it should be applied only to determine whether
patent protection should be continued on any
particular utility patent. Instead of protection being
afforded to competitors only by means of antitrust
litigation, if the Common Denominator test stripped
patent protection after its analysis, a lack of patent
protection would spur innovation in markets where
patent protection was neither necessary nor
beneficial to begin with. Finally, if patent protection
Carrier, supra note 38, at 848.
Id.
157 Id. at 848-49.
155
156
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is removed and patentees were to behave in an
anticompetitive manner, then, the antitrust laws will
apply regularly to remedy that problem.
The Common Denominator test certainly has
much to offer in today’s patent market. Recognizing
that “innovation takes place through different paths
in different industries” is a good first step in modernizing the patent system.158 The Common Denominator test also takes into consideration essential elements of innovation such as market-based incentives, the ease of creating, the difficulty of imitating,
and markets that are cumulative in their innovation.159 Because of these ex ante factors, the Common
Denominator test is much better suited for utility patents rather than design patents.
VI. COPYRIGHTS AND THE D’677 PATENT
Daniel H. Brean, in Enough Is Enough: Time
to Eliminate Design Patents and Rely on More Appropriate Copyright and Trademark Protection for
Product Designs, argues that design patents should
be phased out by copyrights; copyrights will “protect
designs through copyright law to the extent that they
are artistic.”160 In analyzing the possibility of copyright protection, it is important to distinguish between functional and nonfunctional features on
commercial products. This Part examines the possibility of taking the artistic design from the D’677 patent and protecting it with a copyright, rather than a
design patent.
To begin with, would the D’677 design be copyrightable? It is a sculptural work that is capable of
Id. at 854.
Id.
160 Brean, supra note 34, at 374.
158
159
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being both perceived and reproduced, so the D’677
design is appropriate copyright subject matter. 161
The design, albeit minimalistic, is creative, original,
and nonfunctional. If the smartphone designer notices that a competitor has copied his design, and
that design is substantially similar, he may then enforce his copyright.
In order to prove a fair use defense, the alleged copyright infringer would need to demonstrate
that his smartphone design was transformative. 162
The four factors that the court uses to determine the
design’s fair use (i.e., its purpose and character, its
nature, the substantiality of the portion used and the
effect of the use upon the potential market) would
weigh against the alleged infringer.163 But, the more
that he can show that his product is transformative,
the less weight that the four fair use factors will carry.164 Assuming that the D’677 design was implemented in another smartphone, the determination as
to how transformative the subsequent design is will
determine whether the alleged infringer will be liable. If the design were to be taken with almost no
changes, and the alleged infringer sold its product
commercially, the courts would be likely to find liability for a copyright breach.165 But, if the general
square shape was taken and improved upon, to the
extent that the court finds it transformative, the alleged infringer will only have exercised fair use of
the copyrighted design.166
Replacing design patents with copyright pro17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
See supra notes 52-65 and accompanying text.
163 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012); see supra Part III.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id.
161
162
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tection would provide a solution to many of today’s
issues regarding design patent litigation. Inventors
of truly original and creative designs would receive
even more stringent protection (70 years after the
designer’s death)167 than they previously would have
under design patents (20 years after patent is granted).168 As mentioned earlier, Samsung’s counsel
complained that Apple was claiming its monopoly on
rectangles with rounded corners: with this copyright
analysis, Samsung would have been able to argue a
fair use defense. Whether their product was transformative enough for the defense to be effective,
would have been a factual determination for the
court.
This analysis, inquiring into how transformative a design is, adds incentives for competitors to
create new design features, therefore leading to more
innovative products. Transitioning towards copyright law would be a fair approach to allow future
innovators to take already existing ideas and innovate off of them, and if they were to copy, then copyright owners would have protection extending for a
longer period than that granted by patents.
CONCLUSION
In order to optimize innovative consumer
products, patent, antitrust, and copyright law must
be reconciled to a certain extent. Patents encourage
innovation, but at the expense of competition.
Antitrust law encourages competition, but unbridled
competition could lead to a market that takes away
incentives from innovators.

167
168

See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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The scope test169 provides a stronger patent
regimen, while the intent test170 shifts the scale more
towards antitrust law. The Common Denominator
test,171 very wisely, takes into consideration the type
of industry involved. The Common Denominator is a
good test that should be considered in future patent
litigation, but only to the extent of determining
whether patent protection should be continued.
Carrier’s test overlooks the possibility that
sometimes
eliminating
patents
could
spur
innovation, without even entering into consideration
of antitrust law.
Copyright protection, giving protection to true
artistic designs with a reasonable fair use defense,
provides a good alternative to design patents. In the
future, if courts were to apply the Common Denominator test and remove utility patent protection in
warranted situations, consumers would likely receive
the same innovative products at more competitive
prices. Finally, these benefits to the consumer would
also exist if, like Brean argued, courts were to transition design patent protection more towards copyright
protection.172
In the future courts can increase consumer
welfare by loosening some of the legal monopolies
created by utility patents through an industryspecific analysis, and by simplifying the dilemma involved with design patents by phasing them out in
favor of copyright protection.

See supra Part IV.A.
See supra Part IV.B.
171 See supra Part IV.C and Part V.A.
172 See supra Part VI.
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